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Determinants and Dynamics of Farm Diversification
1. Introduction
Typically, firms produce more than one product. In this sense their production is diversified.
After a wave of intense diversification in the sixties and seventies, especially in the United
States but also in Europe, the eighties and nineties have seen a mitigation or even a reversal of
this trend. Nevertheless, the diversified (multi product) firm still is the rule rather than the
exception in the modern industrial sector (Montgomery, 1994) and analysing the determinants
of diversification remains a busy field of research in strategic management and industrial
organisation (Briglauer, 2000).
In contrast to large corporate firms in the non-farm economy, where the wide dispersion of
ownership helps to spread business risk over numerous stockholders, the smaller family farms
in agriculture have little capacity for this kind of risk reduction given that a large share of the
family's and the farm operator's wealth as well as their labour capacity is allocated to their
own (farm) business. It is well known that on-farm product diversification (diversification of
farm production activities) can be an efficient mechanism for dealing with risk by stabilising
expected returns in an uncertain environment and the analysis of this issue already has a long
tradition in agricultural economics.
1
Despite the frequent observation that diversification plays an important role in agriculture,
only few empirical studies on the determinants of farm diversification are available. The
                                                       
1  Nearly half a century has passed since Heady noticed: “the topic of diversification as a means of
handling uncertainty is an old one in agricultural economics” (1952, p. 483). Recently, this issue seems
to have gained renewed interest (Quiroz, and Valdés, 1995; Martin, and McLeay, 1998) not least due to
the liberalisation of agricultural policies and the globalisation of agricultural markets. In the past,
government market interventions have caused domestic prices to vary substantially less than
international ones (Hazell et al., 1990). As domestic prices start following international price signals4
limited number of econometric studies on diversification using micro-data are confined to the
U.S. situation and focus on the relationship between diversification and farm size. White and
Irwin (1972), using aggregate U.S. Census Data, compare diversification across farm size
classes and conclude that larger farms are more specialised. The opposite finding is reported
in Pope and Prescott (1980). Investigating the relationship between farm size as well as other
socio-economic variables and four different measures of diversification for more than 1,000
Californian Crop farms, they find "a strong indication of a positive relationship between
diversification and size" (p. 554). In analysing data on 2,192 farms across three U.S. regions,
Sun, Jinkins and El-Osta (1995) finally distinguish between different "stages of
diversification", which are found to influence the relationship between size and
diversification.
Although these studies differ substantially in the empirical approach used as well as in the
results reported, two common characteristics are to be mentioned. Firstly, they consider farm
production diversification only and do not control for the impact of additional off-farm
income. As pointed out in Pope and Prescott, the exclusion of the off-farm employment status
may introduce a bias in the parameter estimates (in particular of the farm size variable). Given
that additional off-farm income is one form of diversification to reduce risk and considering
the well established empirical observation that smaller farms are more likely to have
additional off-farm income, one would expect the parameter estimate of farm size (in a model
not controlling for the off-farm employment status) to be biased upwards. And secondly, the
existing empirical literature has not yet considered the dynamics of farmer's diversification
behaviour. Using cross-sectional data implies interpreting the results as long-run equilibrium
relationship and does not allow to investigate the actual adjustment of farmers to changes in
economic conditions. Concerning the importance of analysing diversification in a dynamic
                                                                                                                                                                            
more closely, farmers (as well as those working on policies concerned with their welfare) are forced to
consider the implications of larger fluctuations in commodity prices.5
context White and Irwin observe: “Most existing firms are thus a product of past conditions
which mandated diversified production. Their present status determines where they should
go” (p.210).
This paper examines the determinants and dynamics of farm production diversification in
Upper Austria empirically. Using panel data for individual farm households, we (i) focus on
the importance of additional off-farm employment as an explanatory variable in addition to a
number of characteristics of the farm and the farm operator as well as (ii) explicitly consider
changes in the degree of diversification of individual farms over time.
The following section 2 provides a summary of economic rationales for firm (farm)
diversification. Section 3 describes the data and the definitions of the variables, section 4
reports the empirical results and the final section 5 summarises and concludes.
2. Motives for firm (farm) diversification
Theoretical models offer many different arguments about why firms diversify. These
arguments can be divided into three groups: the market power-, the synergy-, and the agency
view.
2 The market power approach considers possible anticompetitive strategies (such as
cross subsidisation or reciprocal buying) employed by diversified firms in pursuit of
increasing profits. The higher probability for multi product firms to interact simultaneously
with a specific competitor in different markets facilitates reciprocal buying or to take
advantage of their conglomerate interdependence by forming collusive outcomes. While this
explanation may be important in many industries, it is of little relevance when applied to the
agricultural sector being characterised by a large number of small family farms.
Synergy effects refers to cost advantages that emerge from the existence of joint production
facilities. If it is cheaper to produce several goods jointly instead of producing each of them6
separately, the cost function exhibits "economies of scope". Although one finds unanimous
approval concerning the definition of the synergy concept,
3 the sources of economies of scope
are not so easy to identify. In addition to purely technical synergies referring to the
complementarity or supplementarity for the products when they are produced in combination
(Heady, 1952) a lot of attention is devoted to operational synergies focusing on shared input
facilities and excess capacity in the presence of demand constraint). If the firms’ current
production of one product is too low to fully employ its fixed inputs, this excess capacity can
be utilised productively by entering into other markets.
4 Financial synergies shift attention
away from the operational side of the firm but create economies of scope by lowering capital
costs. Two arguments are frequently proposed in the literature: Firstly, the possibility to erect
internal capital markets, which reallocate firm capital based on efficiency considerations.
Secondly, by lowering the variability of firms profits, diversification might positively affect
the firms’ capital costs because investors tend to be risk-averse.
The third group of theoretical arguments focuses on the principal-agent relationship between
corporate managers and shareholders. This agency relationship is fraught with opportunistic
managerial behaviour that leads to serious conflicts, in the sense that managers follow
strategies that do not come up to the interests of shareholders. Specifically, managerial
economists
5 maintain that the separation of ownership and control enables management to
enforce utility maximising behaviour (instead of profit maximisation). It is argued that
managerial utility is determined by the growth of firm size, whereby the growth rate stands
proxy for managerial perquisites, monetary rewards, prestige or other non-economic motives.
                                                                                                                                                                            
2  The following section draws heavily on Briglauer (2000).
3  Baumol et al. (1982) formalised this concept in an extensive treatise.
4  It is important to notice that these examples explain diversification only in cases, where contractual
mechanisms fail to employ the free resources. In a world of zero transaction costs the above arguments
have no merit since market contracts would be perfect substitutes for internal production arrangements.
Teece (1980, 1982) identified input categories where it is reasonable to assume that market transaction
costs outweigh transaction costs that arise within a multi product organisation.
5  Most notably, Marris (1964), Baumol (1958) and Williamson (1967).7
Given that demand restrictions in existing product markets limit the rate of firm growth, firms
have an incentive to diversify into new, faster growing markets.
A similar line of reasoning (Amihud and Lev (1981)) states that risk averse managers favour
diversification programs, because manager's risk is closely related to the variation in firm
performance through employment contracts that contain forms of profit sharing. Consequently
managers benefit from diversification strategies that generate more stable streams of income.
With reference to the agricultural sector this argument (together with synergy effects) seems
to have the strongest appeal. As the role of the owner and the manager coincide within family
farms (the “manager” receives all the rewards of his efforts), the farm operator has a strong
incentive to spread personal risks by diversification of farm production.
3. Data and definition of variables
The empirical approach in the present paper is based on a panel of more than 50,000 Upper
Austrian farm households for three years, 1980, 1985, and 1990. Upper Austria, which is the
third largest state in Austria (14.3% of area and 17.2% of population) borders Germany and
the Czech Republic. It is one of three major agricultural regions in Austria and is primarily
devoted to dairy production. While 19% of all farms are located here, these farms own 29% of
all livestock in Austria.
For each year, the farm census collects extensive information on the farm as well as some
family characteristics such as age, sex, and schooling of various family members, and the off-
farm employment status. Given the importance of dairy farming in Upper Austria, our
measures of size and diversification will be based on the number of livestock (measured in
"median large animal units"). A median large animal unit is an index defined according to the
live weight of an animal. A live weight of 650 kg (1,433 pounds) corresponds to one median
large animal unit. This aggregate measure of farm size can be broken down into nine sub-8
categories ("median large animal units" for: calfs, fattened cattle, cattle, piglets, sheeps and
goats, chicken, cows, fattened pigs, and brood sow). Based on these nine product groups we





































is the quantity of the most important product in the group of all nine products (q
max = max(q1,
q2, …, qn)) and n is the number of products (n = 9). Note that complete specialisation implies
DC = DB = DE = 0, whereas the maximum level of diversification is given by DC = DB = 1 and
DE = log(n). The properties of these measures of diversification are discussed in more detail in
Hackbart and Anderson (1978) as well as Gollop and Monahan (1991).
To guarantee a homogenous data base, the analysis is restricted to households that did not exit
from the agricultural sector and reported all relevant information for estimating the equations.
The farm households satisfying these criteria number 40,626. The definition and summary
statistics of all variables used is reported in the Appendix.
4. Empirical results
The results of the instrumental-variable regression using the transformed entropy index (TDE)
as a measure of farm diversification are reported in Table 1.
6 Four different models are
reported. Column (1) has the results of a cross-section model for the 1990 farm census, which
is similar to those estimated by Pope and Prescott (1980) and Sun, Jinkins and El-Osta (1995)
but controls for the off-farm employment status. The parameter estimate of farm size (ln(S)) is
                                                       
6  Since the entropy index DE is bounded by zero and 0.95 (=ln(n)), one may be suspicious of the
assumption of normality. Further, one may wish an estimator which ensures that predicted values for DE
are in the interval (0, 0.95). A popular transformation to alleviate these problems is the logit
transformation (Greene, 1997, p. 227f.) where the dependent variable becomes TDE = ln[DE/(1-DE)]. To
prevent computational problems with the logit transformation where DE = 0, we used the following
modification of the logit transformation TDE = ln[(DE+k)/(1-DE)], with k = 0.1. The econometric results10
Region 4 (R4) -0.146 -0.019 0.006 -0.042
(-14.06) (-2.16) (0.51) (-3.11)
Region 5 (R5) -0.028 -0.014 -0.002 -0.026
(-3.01) (-1.72) (-0.19) (-2.14)
Hardshipzone 1 (HZ1) -0.004 0.066 0.073 0.055
(-0.49) (8.75) (7.62) (4.88)
Hardshipzone 2 (HZ2) 0.017 0.066 0.078 0.053
(1.72) (7.45) (6.86) (4.06)
Hardshipzone 3 (HZ3) 0.045 0.075 0.066 0.077
(4.24) (8.07) (5.61) (5.71)
Hardshipzone 4 (HZ4) 0.263 0.083 0.296 0.035
(4.49) (1.64) (3.07) (0.56)
Diversification (TDEt) -0.351 -0.232 -0.426
(-76.71) (-38.81) (-65.56)
R2 0.453 0.138 0.094 0,169





Log-Likelihood -38,079.9 -32,306.6 -10,798.0 -20,335.7
Restricted Log-Likelihood -50,347.0 -35,351.6 -11,703.2 -22,446.9
___________________________________________________________________________
Remarks: The degrees of freedom for the F-test are: a) 40,627; b) 18,055; and c) 22,555.
The time index t of the explanatory variables refers to 1990 in column (1) and to
1985 in columns (2) to (4).
As expected, the existence of additional off-farm income reduces the degree of
diversification. If the married couple spends less than 50% of total working time on farm
work and more than 50% on off-farm work (PT = 1), the entropy index is 6.12 percent below
that of an otherwise identical full-time farm. Part-time farms will c.p. have less time to devote
to the production of a broad agricultural product mix. Furthermore, and maybe more
important, off-farm income has to be considered as one strategy to diversify employment risks
and thus reduces the necessity to diversify on the farm.
9
Table 1 also suggests personal characteristics of the farm operator as well as the farm family
to influence on-farm diversification. According to column (1), diversification significantly
increases with the farm operators farm-specific schooling (EDU) and the number of family
members living on the farm (#FAM). Management and coordination becomes more
demanding as diversification of the farm increases. By improving managerial skills, schooling12
In order to investigate changes in diversification of individual farms, we compute first
differences of the entropy measure for the period 1985 to 1990 to be used as a dependent
variable in the regression models in columns (2), (3), and (4) of Table 1.
The regression equation in column (2) is estimated on all farms. Columns (3) and (4) report
parameter estimates from models using data for full-time and part-time farms only to allow
different adjustment paths to the steady state for the two groups. The results in column (2)
compare well with those reported in column (1). Most of the explanatory variables are
significant and have the same sign as in the model explaining levels of diversification.
Compared to column (1), the schooling (EDU) and gender (GENDER) variables now are
insignificant, the parameter estimate for the age variable (AGE) is negative and significant
and the farm operator's marrital status (MARR) now has a positive and significant impact. The
parameter estimates reported in column (2) imply that older farm operators, working on small
part-time farms with a small number of family members living on the farm are reducing the
degree of diversification most. The significant and negative parameter estimate of the initial
diversification level implies convergence of the farms towards their own steady state
diversification level.
A comparison of columns (3) and (4) indicates that the process of convergence differs
between full-time and part-time farms. Based upon the parameter estimates of Table 1, Figure
2 shows the adjustment paths for a hypothetical full-time as well as part-time farm (which are
defined by taking mean and mode values of exogenous and continuous dummy variables
respectively).16
The observation that those farms, being considered as the fittest for surviving in the long run
(large, full-time farms managed by a young farm operator) report the smallest increases in
specialisation (the largest increases in diversification) suggests, that for this group of farms,
the potential gains from realising economies of scale are not that important compared to the
returns from risk reduction due to on-farm diversification. Given that the liberalisation of
international agricultural markets will further increase the variability of domestic prices, one
might expect the current trend towards specialisation of production to slow down or
eventually be reversed, in particular, since those farms reporting to reduce diversification
most quickly, have been found to face the highest probability of exiting from the agricultural
sector (Weiss, 1999).
Investigating the probability of farm exits simultaneously with the dynamics of diversification
would be an important extension of the present empirical analysis insofar, as the results
reported from the sample of surviving farms only might be biased due to sample selectivity.
Similarly, one might wish to consider the issue of off-farm employment more carefully by
estimating a simultaneous off-farm employment / diversification model. Finally, it is
important to keep in mind that the continuous measures of diversification used here captures
only one dimension of diversification. In comparing categorical and continuous measures,
Hall and St. John (1994) for example conclude that the choice of measurement technique is
important and will influence research results. Additionally applying categorical typologies of
diversification thus would allow us to more carefully study and understand the determinants
and dynamics of farm diversification.17
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Table A.1.Definition and Descriptive Statistics of Variables
Variable Symbol Part-time Farms Full-time Farms All Farms
Mean Mean Mean
(Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.) (Std. Dev.)
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Number of Observations N 22,200 18,072 40,115
_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Farm size in 1985 is the Log ln(S)i  6.3049 7.4726 6.8309
of Livestock (measured in (1.3177) (0.9558) (1.3006)
Median Large Animal Units):
Farm operators age in years AGEi,85 1.805 1.0963 1.1434
in 1985 (0.2983) (0.2924) (0.2979)
Schooling EDUi,85 0.3946 0.3793 0.3882
(0.4888) (0.4852) (0.4873)
Part-time farming: married  PTi,85 1.0000 0.0000 0.5534
couple spends more than 50%
of total working time on off-
farm employment.
Dummy for farm operators MARRi,85 0.8972 0.7589 0.8360
married state (1=married;  (0.3037) (0.4278) (0.3703)
0=unmarried)
Number of family members #FAMi,85 4.9369 5.0822 5.0058
(1.8684) (2.0980) (1.9744)
Farm operators sex:  GENDERi,85 0.1817 0.1033 0.1464
(0 = male, 1 = female)
Region 1  R1 0.0220 0.0358 0.0278
(0.1466) (0.1858) (0.1645)
Region 2  R2 0.1361 0.1609 0.1472
(0.3429) (0.3674) (0.3543)
Region 3  R3 0.1012 0.0908 0.0966
(0.3016) (0.2873) (0.2954)
Region 4  R4 0.1994 0.2374 0.2164
(0.3996) (0.4255) (0.4118)
Region 5  R5 0.2565 0.2484 0.2529
(0.4367) (0.4321) (0.4347)
Hardshipzone 1 HZ1 0.2553 0.2335 0.2460
(0.4360) (0.4230) (0.4307)
Hardshipzone 2  HZ2 0.1447 0.1150 0.1316
(0.3518) (0.3191) (0.3381)
Hardshipzone 3  HZ3 0.1276 0.1023 0.1164
(0.3337) (0.3031) (0.3207)
Hardshipzone 4  HZ4 0.0041 0.0012 0.0028
(0.0635) (0.0341) (0.0525)
Entropy Index of DE90 0.2844 0.4113 0.3416
Diversification1990 (0.1755) (0.1604) (0.1801)
Entropy Index of DE85 0.3190 0.4375 0.3725
Diversification 1985 (0.1676) (0.1496) (0.1700)
Transformed Entropy  TDE90 -0.7363 -0.1891 -0.4893
Index of Diversification 1990 (0.8366) (0.7178) (0.8301)
Transformed Entropy  TDE85 -0.5649 -0.0747 -0.3431
Index of Diversification 1985 (0.7599) (0.6463) (0.7499)20
Table A.2:  Results of the instrumental-variable regression analysis using the transformed
diversification measures.
___________________________________________________________________________
Dependent Variable: TDC TDB TDE
_________________________________________________________________
Independent Symbol Parameter Parameter. Parameter
Variable (t-value) (t-value) (t-value)
(1) (2) (3)
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Constant -2.419 -2.363 -2.344
(-82.54) (-75.47) (-89.29)
Farm size log(GVE) 0.409 0.469 0.415
(107.18) (114.90) (121.07)
Part-time farm PT -0.104 -0.038 -0.075
(-7.21) (-2.47) (-5.80)
Schooling EDU 0.019 0.021 0.015
(2.72) (2.85) (2.48)
Age  AGE -0.031 -0.025 -0.017
(-2.53) (-1.91) (-1.57)
Number of family members #FAM 0.012 0.016 0.020
(5.75) (7.15) (10.26)
Gender GENDER 0.052 0.054 0.068
(5.41) (5.29) (7.95)
Marrital status MARR -0.012 -0.031 -0.019
(-1.07) (-2.62) (-1.94)
Region 1 R1 -0.223 -0.249 -0.265
(-9.71) (-10.18) (-12.90)
Region 2 R2 -0.071 -0.086 -0.090
(-5.87) (-6.63) (-8.28)
Region 3 R3 -0.116 -0.122 -0.118
(-8.58) (-8.52) (-9.84)
Region 4 R4 -0.145 -0.161 -0.146
(-12.53) (-12.96) (-14.06)
Region 5 R5 -0.053 -0.053 -0.028
(-5.04) (-4.66) (-3.01)
Hardshipzone 1 HZ1 0.001 0.009 -0.004
(0.03) (0.87) (-0.49)
Hardshipzone 2 HZ2 0.013 0.028 0.017
(1.13) (2.29) (1.72)
Hardshipzone 3 HZ3 0.028 0.054 0.045
(2.33) (4.22) (4.24)
Hardshipzone 4 HZ4 0.247 0.281 0.263
(3.77) (4.02) (4.49)
R2 0.396 0.416 0,453
F-Test [16, 40.627] 1,667.7 1,810.6 2,108.6
Log-Likelihood -42,558.5 -45,240.8 -38,079.9
Restricted Log-Likelihood -52,827.2 -56,188.4 -50,5374.0